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Abstract
The attempt to relate changes in human cognition to changes in human
behaviour can be fruitful for cognitive science and archaeology alike. The
process has the potential to enrich both our understanding of cognition,
and interpretations of the archaeological evidence. A practical difficulty is
the lack of clarity as to what cognitive change refers to. Characterisations
vary considerably, even in regard to locus. Use of broad-brush termi-
nology (e.g., ‘higher levels of consciousness’) can add to the uncertainty.
The present chapter argues that an effective way to understand cognitive
change is in terms of conceptual structure, and the meronomic processes
that apply. Building on the ontological distinction between meronomy and
taxonomy, this approach allows cognitive change (by conceptual innova-
tion) to be modeled precisely, while opening the way for quantification
of conceptual creativity. This chapter shows how the model is derived,
and explores some of the ways it might be connected with data from
C¸atalho¨yu¨k.
1 Introduction
There is a natural desire to explain the development of cognitive phenomena
that seem particularly characteristic of the human mind. Creativity is a case
in point, consciousness another. A recent archaeological project has attempted
to understand evidence from the neolithic site of C¸atalho¨yu¨k in relation to
emergence of both consciousness and creativity at the dawn of settled life. This
project faces the need to settle on a precise understanding of what is meant by
the terms in question. But theorists differ as to what this understanding should
be. And there are deeper disputes relating to cognition in general. What the
term ‘cognitive’ signifies continues to be debated, with some arguing that it has
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no precise meaning that would differentiate it from terms such as ‘adaptive’ and
‘intelligent’.
A major aim of the project is to understand the degree to which cognitive
change underlies behaviors that seem to have occurred at this site. This ne-
cessitates adopting a model of cognitive change. What is argued here is that
a meronomic model is well suited to this purpose. Meronomic analysis allows
cognitive change (by conceptual innovation) to be modeled in a precise way. It
also allows conceptual creativity to be quantitatively assessed. This is subject
to some reservations, however. Given the hope of the approach being of use
in an archaeological setting, it is worth examining the pros and cons in more
detail.
Functionalities of the human mind, cognitive or otherwise, remain relatively
mysterious at this time. Proposals are forthcoming (e.g., Ga¨rdenfors, MIT, 2004;
Clark, 2016) but consensus remains elusive. The lack of agreement obstructs any
project which seeks to make reference to mental phenomena in an instrumental
way (e.g., to explain archaeological evidence). Ventures in this direction can
be made. But as they are forced to adopt a specific view of cognition, their
fate is bound up with the view in question. Mithen’s (1996) original approach
in cognitive archaeology, for example, adopted Fodor’s (1983) proposal for a
modular mental architecture, and was bound to it for that reason.
With cognitive science unable to settle on a received view of cognition, the
prospects for a robust cognitive archaeology may seem limited. But a mero-
nomic approach gets around this to some degree. The framework makes no
assumptions about the mind, other than that it trades in the identification of
categories. That this capacity exists is universally agreed; the use of mental
concepts is accepted by all theorists (Machery, 2009). (The cognitive science
view of a concept as a mental representation of a category is assumed through-
out.) In practice, the existence of mental concepts can hardly be denied, since
without them there can be no language, and without language, there can be no
denials.
How is this of use? The starting point in the meronomic approach is recogni-
tion that concepts are inherently accommodative. Due to the way one concept
may be able to accommodate others in combination, they can be assembled into
hierarchical structures. We can conceptualize a combination of food and water
as sustenance, for example. What this reveals is that the concept of sustenance
has the capacity to accommodate the concepts of food and water taken in com-
bination. These three concepts can be assembled in a hierarchical structure,
with the concept of sustenance in the accommodative role. Other hierarchical
arrangements of these three concepts are semantically illegitimate. We cannot
conceptualize water to be a combination of food and sustenance, for example.
This capacity for accommodation endows concepts with mathematical prop-
erties. Specifically, it renders them inherently generative. Any set of concepts
gives rise to a (possibly empty) set of accommodative structures. These can be
derived in a purely analytic way, by identifying all legitimate accommodations.
This becomes of interest from the cognitive point of view, as it provides a way of
analyzing the compositional conceptualizations that a particular endowment of
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concepts enables. The degree to which a construction is novel can be measured
in a formal way. This leads on to a way of modeling conceptual change and
creativity that is essentially mathematical in nature.
This does not solve the problem that we do not know with any certainty
what cognition is, or how it works. It does not provide archaeologists with
what is required for truly robust projects in cognitive archaeology. Due to
its minimal supposition, and its reliance on formal analysis, it does provide
leverage, however. To undertake meronomic analysis, we only have to specify the
endowment of concepts that is assumed to exist initially. Any results obtained
are of cognitive significance if the mind (or more specifically the conceptual
system) can utilize conceptual accommodation. This is not to assume very
much, given our self-evident capacity to compose accommodative constructions
by means of language (as illustrated above).
A meronomic brand of cognitive archaeology retains some degree of immu-
nity from changing fashions in cognitive science, then. A particular proposal
must assume some endowment of concepts, and it has the potential to be criti-
cised or invalidated thereby. The award of cognitive significance to the results
obtained also requires the assumption that conceptual accommodation is within
the repertoire of the mind. Otherwise, the approach is an exercise in purely for-
mal analysis, and no less secure as such that any mathematical calculation.
It is useful to be clear about how this relates to the general issue of con-
ceptualization, however. Interpretation of materials and activities is obviously
something archaeologists have great interest in. To interpret evidence of human
activity in the past, it is necessary to make assumptions about the meanings,
interpretations, categories etc. that underpinned those activities. There has to
be some understanding of how worldly phenomena were ‘chunked’ by the people
in question. Vigorous debate on this issue is the natural result. An important
theme is the danger of over-extending the modern mindset. The temptation to
apply a modern conceptual apparatus to settings in which it may have played
little or no role is strengthened by the necessity to use modern language in stat-
ing any proposal. As modern language is saturated with the modern mindset,
expressing ideas that deviate from it is less than straightforward.
This gives rise to cautionary notes, such as Keane’s assertion that ‘language
should not be the privileged theoretical model for a semiotics of material things’
(Keane, 2003, p. 422). The need to resist specific emphases is also highlighted.
Pauketat notes (with approval) the increasing tendency in archaeology to reject
traditional ‘dualisms that separate thought and action’ (Pauketat, 2013, p. 35),
while Keane acknowledges (with disapproval) the lingering tendency ‘to divide
our attention between things and ideas’ (Keane, 2005, p. 182).
Specific proposals for new forms of conceptualization are made. Keane and
Pauketat both favour the idea of a ‘bundle’ as a fundamental unit of concep-
tualization (Keane, 2005; Pauketat, 2013).1 It is argued that, in addition to
other benefits, viewing things in this way can overcome the modern tendency to
1Pauketat advocates ‘viewing the world as dynamic relationships mediated by bundles’
(Pauketat, 2013, p. 56).
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separate continuity and change. In Pauketat’s opinion, ‘Using the metaphorical
language of a bundle ... we might begin to see continuity and change as one
and the same phenomenon’ (Pauketat, 2013, p. 55). Such proposals inevitably
face the difficulty that meaningful exchange ‘requires a shared language and a
medium of communication’ (Keane, 2005, p. 200). To the extent that this neces-
sitates sharing a conceptual apparatus, ventures towards significantly different
interpretations of the world are inherently problematic.
As it involves assuming an initial endowment of concepts, a meronomic ap-
proach is, to some extent, subject to these concerns. At the same time, it can
claim some degree of independence. Which concepts are assumed to be endowed
is not the critical issue, as they may form only a small subset of the concepts
that can be generatively derived. The commitment to an initial conceptual
endowment is not a commitment to a whole conceptual apparatus—only to its
seeds. The conceptual apparatus is a potentially large derivation from the initial
endowment. The natural objective in a meronomic approach is to assume a min-
imal number of concepts of maximal generative capacity, then. The conceptual
apparatus then derived has the potential to depart from the modern mindset
to an arbitrary extent. Any meronomic approach should aim to restrict the
assumed endowment in this way.
The remainder of the article set out the approach in more detail, and ex-
amines how it can be used to model cognitive change and conceptual creativity.
The eventual aim is to roadtest the method as a way of assessing evidence
from C¸atalho¨yu¨k. The section immediately following examines the mechanics
of meronomic composition, taking particular account of its less obvious aspects.
The role potentially played by singular accommodations and abstract concepts
is highlighted. Section 3 explores the ways in which the meronomic model lends
itself to quantitative assessment of conceptual creativity. Finally, Section 4
considers application of the model to evidence of human behavior at neolithic
C¸atalho¨yu¨k.
2 Meronomic conceptual change
As noted, the ability of concepts to compose meronomically derives from their
capacity for accommodation. Suppose the combination of an X and a Y can be
conceptualized as a Z (where X, Y and Z are concepts). This establishes that
concept Z is able to accommodate the concept combination X+ Y. The three con-
cepts are potentially organized in a hierarchical structure, with Z as parent (or
holonym), and X and Y as children (or meronyms). To illustrate: the combina-
tion of a lawn and flowerbed can be conceptualized as a garden. This establishes
that GARDEN can accommodate the combination LAWN + FLOWERBED.2 There
is a valid meronomic arrangement of concepts in which GARDEN is the parent
(holonym), and LAWN and FLOWERBED are the children (meronyms). Using
the terminology of Artificial Intelligence, the structure consists of two has-a
2Concept names are written in upper case throughout.
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links: one from GARDEN to LAWN, and another from GARDEN to FLOWERBED
(Brachman, 1983).
GARDEN
LAWN FLOWERBED
Figure 1: Meronomic organization of GARDEN, LAWN and FLOWERBED
reflecting the capacity to conceptualize the combination of a lawn and flowerbed
as a garden.
The structure is drawn out in Figure 1 in the conventional way, with root
pointing upwards. There are two ways to describe what is expressed. The hier-
archy can be seen as the construction of a concept. Putting the cited concepts
together in this hierarchical way has the effect of constructing a specialization
of the garden concept; namely, the concept of a garden comprising a lawn and
flowerbed. Viewed this way, the hierarchy is a compositional construction. Al-
ternatively, we can view it in a decompositional way. The structure can be seen
to express a way of decomposing the concept of garden. On this view, what is
specified is the potential for a garden to have a lawn and flowerbed as parts.
It will be seen that the two views are two sides of the same coin. In one
case, we focus on how a complex idea can be put together; in the other, on
how it can be broken down. Historically, the decompositional interpretation
has been particularly prominent, however. Dubbing meronomies ‘part-whole
hierarchies’ or even ‘partonomies’ (Tversky, 1989, p. 983), theorists have seen
them primarily as a way of representing knowledge about how concepts of wholes
decompose into concepts of parts (e.g. Winston and Herrmann, 1987). In
some cases, theorists have taken the step of viewing the meronomy as a type of
conceptual analysis (e.g. Gerstl and Pribbenow, 1995). The structure has been
seen as the ontological counterpart of the taxonomy—a way of using hierarchical
structure to show necessary conceptual relationships. According to this view,
taxonomic organization of concepts expresses relations of subsumption, while
meronomic organization expresses relations of ‘parthood’ (Tversky, 2005).3
The analytic view of the meronomy has proved problematic, however, due
to the inherent subjectivity of meronomic composition. The fact that the com-
bination of a lawn and flowerbed can be conceptualized as a garden falls short
of being an analytic truth. This is just one of many—perhaps infinitely many—
ways to conceptualize the constitution of a garden. As Tversky points out,
concepts ‘can be decomposed in many different ways’ (Tversky, 2005, p. 9).
Furthermore, parts can ‘be optional; in the sense, they might or might not ap-
pear in the whole to which they relate’ (Fiorini and Ga¨rdenfors, 2014, p. 138).
3Tversky, for example, recognizes ‘two general forms of organization of knowledge, taxo-
nomic, that is, subdivision into kinds, and partonomic, that is, subdivision into parts’ (Tver-
sky, 1989, p. 983).
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This and other problems affecting the analytic view of the meronomy have been
widely debated in the field of Ontology (Cruse, 1979; Johansson, 2006).4
2.1 Variations in constructive form
The construction discussed above—a lawn and flowerbed conceptualized as a
garden—is typical in its use of concrete concepts and two-way branching. A
meronomic unit can have any number of branches, however. The structure can
be of any depth, and the concepts featured can be arbitrarily abstract. The
structures of Figure 2 illustrate some of the possibilities. Consider the top
left hierarchy. A journey can be conceptualized as combining a flight and a
drive. Hence, there is a valid meronomic unit with JOURNEY as parent, and
FLIGHT and DRIVE as children. This is the structure shown. Its meaning is
the concept we started with: a journey involving a flight and drive.5 The top
right hierarchy illustrates use of three-way branching. A ceremony, betrothal
and reception taken together can be conceptualized as a wedding. Hence there
is a valid meronomic structure as shown. What is constructed is the concept of
a wedding with this makeup.
JOURNEY 
FLIGHT  DRIVE
WEDDING
CEREMONY BETROTHAL RECEPTION
INDUCEMENT 
REWARD  PUNISHMENT
GARDEN
LAWN PATH FLOWER-BED
Figure 2: Meronomies illustrating variation in accommodative inclusivity and
conceptual abstraction.
The bottom left structure illustrates the potential for accommodation to be
noticeably inclusive. The combination of a bribe and fine can be conceptualized
as an inducement. Hence, INDUCEMENT can be the parent of a meronomic unit
which has BRIBE and FINE as children. The meaning obtained is the idea we
started with: a bribe and fine conceptualized as an inducement. As well as
using abstract concepts, this structure exploits accommodation that is rather
general relative to what is accommodated. An inducement can have many other
constitutions, of many different kinds. The effect of the construction is thus
to specialize the accommodating concept’s meaning quite considerably. The
4Habel et al. (1995) draw attention to the difficulty of stabilizing the semantics of the
parthood relation.
5This article takes ‘meaning’, ‘idea’ and ‘concept’ to be synonymous, and uses them inter-
changeably.
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existence of many alternatives is implied. (This harks back to Tversky’s (2005)
point, that concepts can be decomposed in many different ways. The more
general the accommodating concept is, the more ways it can be (de)composed.)
The potential for use of singular accommodations is also of note. A lawn
by itself can be conceptualized as a garden. Hence there is a valid hierarchi-
cal construction which has GARDEN as parent, and LAWN as child. What is
obtained is the idea of a lawn conceptualized as a garden (i.e., the idea of a
garden consisting solely of a lawn). Other examples of singular accommodation
can be visualized. A disagreement can be conceptualized as a battle: BATTLE
can accommodate DISAGREEMENT. Fishing can be conceptualized as a pastime:
PASTIME can accommodate FISHING. With these singular constructions, it be-
comes natural to use the phrase ‘classified as’ instead of ‘conceptualized as’.
The three constructions above can be considered to stem from the fact that a
lawn can be classified as a garden, that a disagreement can be classified as a
battle, and that fishing can be classified as a pastime. This style of description
will be used wherever possible.
With the potential for singular accommodations taken into account, it is
possible to identify one way in which meronomy is related to taxonomy. Imagine
a singular accommodation in which the accommodated concept is subsumed by
the accommodating concept (i.e., where the extension of the latter is within
that of the former). Given a fine can be classified as a penalty, we might have
a structure with PENALTY as parent, and FINE as child, for example. As a
fine is a special case of a penalty, this is, in fact, ordinary class subsumption.
The construction is an is-a link in effect. Taxonomy can be seen as a limiting
case of meronomy in this situation. For all practical purposes, a meronomy
passes muster as a taxonomy if all accommodations are singular, and all are
class-subsumptive. Another special case occurs if the accommodating concept
in a meronomic unit is COMBINATION itself. A new concept is then composed,
but in a redundant way. What is accommodated is a combination by definition.
Accommodation using COMBINATION, or any equivalent, is redundant.6
Making full use of the meronomic repertoire, and exploiting the potential
for multi-level constructions, conceptual meanings of considerable complexity
can be built up. Singular accommodations provide a way of expressing basic
attributes and properties. A chair can be classified as red (RED can accommo-
date CHAIR). Children can be classified as young (YOUNG can accommodate
CHILDREN). Snow can be classified as deep (DEEP can accommodate SNOW).
Constructions like these can also be used to assemble concepts of role. Children
can be classified as the agent of an action. Snow can be classified as the target
6There is a philosophical dimension to this. If the accommodating concept in a mero-
nomic construction is not COMBINATION (or some equivalent), the idea constructed is then
more than simply the ‘sum of the parts’. The construction conforms to requirements that
philosophers generally consider to apply to concepts of wholes. Aristotle, for example, states
that ‘The whole is something over and above its parts, and not just the sum of them all’
(Metaphysics, Book H, 1045: 8-10: Ross, 1924). In similar vein, John Stuart Mill writes ‘it
appears to me the Complex Idea, formed by the blending together of several simpler ones,
should ... be said to result from, or be generated by, the simple ideas, not to consist of them’
(Mill, 1843/1965, p. 29).
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of an action, and so on.
Concepts constructed by singular accommodations can be incorporated into
more complex structures to obtain meanings not unlike those we encounter in
language. Consider the idea of a rock blocking a stream. A blockage can be
conceptualized as having an agent in the form of a rock (a rock classified as
agent), and an object in the form of a stream (a stream classified as object).
Hence there is a valid meronomic construction which has BLOCKAGE as parent,
and ROCK classified as AGENT as one child, and STREAM classified as OBJECT
as the other. This hierarchical arrangement of concepts constructs the concept
of a rock blocking a stream (see Figure 3).
STREAM
BLOCKAGE
ROCK
AGENT TARGET
SNOW
LOVE
YOUNG
AGENT TARGET
CHILDREN
UNDERSTANDING 
AGENT  TARGET 
YOUNG
CHILDREN 
CONSEQUENCE 
CAUSE  RESULT 
HAVOC DEEP
SNOW 
Figure 3: Meronomic construction of ideas involving agents and targets.
This example illustrates that placing concepts into a meronomic hierarchy
can produce ideas involving agents and objects, taking roles in specific types of
action. The semantic possibilities can be further illustrated by making minor
changes to the structure. Say we change ROCK to CHILDREN. The structure now
yields the idea of children blocking a stream. Say we also change BLOCKAGE
to LOVE, and STREAM to FRUIT. This idea obtained is now that children love
fruit. Changing LOVE to FEAR, FRUIT to SNAKES, and CHILDREN to PEOPLE
produces the idea that people fear snakes, and so on.
These examples also highlight use of recursion. The output of any mero-
nomic construction is a new concept; new concepts are the ingredients for new
constructions. Meronomic construction is a fully recursive procedure. In prin-
ciple, the depth of a meronomic hierarchy is unbounded for this reason. An
example showcasing three levels of construction appears in the bottom left of
Figure 3. This is the top left structure with BLOCKAGE changed to LOVE, and
ROCK changed to CHILDREN. The additional structural element has the effect of
classifying CHILDREN as YOUNG. As a result of these changes, what is obtained
is the idea that young children in particular love snow.
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A more complex case is illustrated on the right. This hierarchy embeds one
three-level construction within another. A consequence can be conceptualized
as having a cause in the form of deep snow, and a result in the form of havoc.
This reveals the potential for a two-child arrangement of concepts in which
CONSEQUENCE is the parent. Assuming HAVOC is made the child of RESULT,
and CAUSE is made the parent of a subconstruction which has DEEP as the
parent of SNOW, what is obtained is the idea of havoc being a consequence of
deep snow.
The meaning of the enclosing construction can then be established. An
understanding can be conceptualized as having an agent in the form of young
children, and an object in the form of the consequence in question. There is
a valid hierarchical arrangement which makes UNDERSTANDING the parent of
the relevant structures. One of the structures builds the idea of an agent in the
form of young children. The other, the idea of the consequence just described.
The overall meaning is then that young children understand that deep snow
causes havoc. Again, variations can be envisaged. Changing UNDERSTANDING
to LOVE yields the idea that young children love the idea that deep snow causes
havoc. Changing SNOW to RAIN, and DEEP to HEAVY produces that idea that
young children understand that heavy rain causes havoc.
With abstract concepts, singular accommodation and recursion all brought
into play, conceptual accommodation is found to be have considerable semantic
fertility, then. The ability that concepts have to fit together meronomically
allows complex ideas to be assembled. Semantic precision is always retained,
however. The meaning of any complex derives directly from the meaning of its
components: it is the meaning of the accommodating element conceptualized as
accommodating the meanings of the accommodated elements (taken together).
A meronomic structure always defines its meaning in this compositional way,
directly expressing the compositionality principle (Szabo´, 2012). The capacity
of concepts to compose meronomically is found to be inherent to their capacity
for accommodation.
How does this model of conceptual construction relate to the general issue
of conceptualization, as viewed from the archaeological point of view? Under-
standing the meanings, signs, concepts, categories etc. salient to a particular
time and place is a matter of great importance in archaeology. Reference has
already been made to Pauketat’s (2013) proposal to do this by means of the
notion of a ‘bundle’, where this construct can assemble phenomena as, of or in
time. Pauketat envisages entire networks of ‘sacred objects, ceremonial build-
ings, human bodies, celestial bodies, and unseen spirits [being] seamlessly bun-
dled, connected, embodied, and emplaced’ (Pauketat, 2013, p. 44). This way
of conceptualizing phenomena departs from the modern way of thinking, and
may or may not be achaeologically useful accordingly. The meronomic model
of conceptualization has no implications either way. Its only supposition is that
cognition involves the grouping (chunking) of phenomena. Bundling being a
way of grouping phenomena, there is no inconsistency. Proposals of this nature
can sit along side the meronomic model of conceptual construction.
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3 Quantifying creativity
An advantage of meronomic analysis is its potential use for quantifying concep-
tual creativity. On the face of it, all meronomic constructions are alike in terms
of novelty. Every construction accommodates a certain combination of concepts
within another concept. The procedure never varies. Constructions may differ
considerably, however, in the degree to which they create extensional novelty.
The extension (or, more formally, extensional meaning) of a concept is the
set of entities to which it refers (Carnap, 1947). The extension of RED is the
set of all red things. The extension of BRIBE is the set of all bribes, and so
on. A meronomic construction produces a new concept by combining concepts
hierarchically. What is the extensional meaning of a concept constructed in
this way? As extensional meanings are sets, we know that accommodation of
one extensional meaning within another entails the accommodation of one set
within another. This is the operation that we call set intersection. But it is
important to recognize that what is accommodated—and thus intersected—is
the joint extension of the combination. The rule that applies is as follows:
• The extensional meaning of a meronomic construction is the joint exten-
sion of the accommodated combination intersected with the extension of
the accommodating concept.
Consider the example of a bribe and fine jointly conceptualized as an induce-
ment. The extensional meaning is the set of all inducements intersected with
the set of all bribe + fine combinations. Contrast this with the case of a grate,
hearth and chimney jointly conceptualized as a fireplace. In the latter case, the
extensional meaning is the set of all fireplaces intersected with the set of all
grate + hearth + chimney combinations. The two examples differ considerably
in terms of extensional novelty. The combination of a grate, hearth and chim-
ney is a fireplace almost by definition: virtually all fireplaces have this make-up.
The intersection differs little from the two sets from which it is derived. The
extensional meaning derived has little if any novelty.
In the case of a bribe and fine conceptualized as an inducement, the derived
intersection is more novel. As inducements can take many other forms than
bribe + fine combinations, and as a bribe + fine combination can be many
things other than an inducement, the intersection deviates more significantly
from its two sources. Accordingly, the outcome is a more novel extensional
meaning. An effective way to understand novelty in the context of meronomic
conceptualization, then, is in terms of extensional innovation. In what follows,
constructions will be termed inventive if the associated extension differs signif-
icantly from the two sets from which it is derived, and derivative otherwise.
In an extreme case of inventive construction, the derived intersection may
be empty, but potentially filled in by application of background knowledge.
Consider, for example, a lake and river jointly conceptualized as a warrior. The
intersection of the set of all warriors with the set of all lake + river combinations
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would seem to be empty. But it is not impossible to imagine a phenomenon
that might be characterised in this way. (Imagine, for example: rainfall causes
the lake to expand and the river to flood, resulting in the action of the river
destroying dwellings.) Cases of this type will be termed radically inventive.
A second aspect of novelty involves productivity. As every meronomic con-
struction creates a new concept, and as new concepts are the ingredients of new
meronomic constructions, any construction has the potential to give rise to (i.e.,
enable) others. Constructions can have knock-on effects. If we take the position
that concepts of greater novelty are likely to be more productive, this becomes a
second way of quantifying conceptual creativity. The more a construction pro-
vides the means of making further constructions, the more it can be described as
novel. The terms potent and inert will be used to characterize this. The former
term will designate a construction that is especially productive; the latter, one
that is not. Equipped with this basic, quantitative terminology, the meronomic
model can be used to explore creative aspects of cognitive conceptual change,
in relation to archaeological evidence.
4 Application to archaeological evidence
As an initial exploration of how the model can be applied to archaeological data,
it is useful to focus on some evidence reported by Gebel (2002, 2013). Gebel
records that, at the neolithic site of Ba’ja, small stone tools seem to have been
inserted into walls as a method of symbolic reinforcement. In his words,
the hidden objects used in the walls and floors most likely served as
a forceful “medicine” against evil influence; hammerstones and celts,
but also grinders, all representing heavy-duty tools, could have been
understood as practical instruments to strengthen a wall ... Strength
was added to the structure, especially necessary with the terraced
architecture of Ba’ja (Gebel, 2002, p. 131).
Gebel sees the introduction of heavy-duty tools to reinforce weak walls as
application of a ‘forceful medicine’. It is possible to look at this from a mero-
nomic point of view. The starting point for this is to define the conceptual
endowment people are assumed to possess in advance. Given Gebel’s interpre-
tation, it seems reasonable to suppose a repertoire of basic concepts would have
been in currency. Assume that at least the following were included: WALL,
TOOL, STONE, EARTH, HARD OBJECT, LIFE and SOURCE. A concept of the
IMPLANTING (of an object) also seems to be implied, along with something like
a concept of HARVESTING (of power).
With these concepts assumed to be possessed, it is possible to consider the
conceptual innovations that might have precipitated the behavior of placing
heavy-duty tools into walls. One scheme focuses on the materials from which a
wall can be constructed. A wall is potentially conceptualized as a combination
of stone and earth. Assuming a stone can be classified as a hard object, there
is a potential analogy between stones and heavy-duty tools, traced through the
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hardness that they have in common. Given one meronomic construction featur-
ing HARD OBJECT as parent of STONE, and another featuring HARD OBJECT as
parent of TOOL, an association between the two children is formed, potentially
enabling the former to substitute for the latter. On this account, the conceptual
process is not complex. But the innovations involved do seem to entail some
element of creativity. Both the enabling conceptualizations would appear to be
towards the inventive end of the inventive/derivative spectrum.
An alternative scheme focuses on the potential role of IMPLANTING. Being
users of agriculture, people of this time may have conceptualized implanting as
life making (in the sense that planting a seed has this effect). This could set
the stage for a cognitive sequence in which the placement of a tool into a wall is
conceptualized as implanting, and hence as life making. On this interpretation,
a heavy-duty tool might be understood to be placed into a wall as a way of
giving the wall the strength of life specifically. In a variation on the theme, the
wall might be conceptualized as an extension of the ground, rather than as a
structure placed over it. This could potentially reinforce conceptualization of
the act as a form of implanting.
The latter of these two schemes may be closer to what Gebel has in mind
when he speaks of ‘forceful medicine’. The meronomic structures involved seem
not to be implausible, at least not from a modern perspective. The indications
of conceptual creativity are perhaps slightly stronger in the latter of the two
accounts. In both cases, the enabling constructions are towards the inventive
end of the inventive/derivative spectrum. But, in the latter case, the concep-
tual connection established between implanting and agriculture has a potential
potency extending beyond the immediate context of wall construction.
4.1 Evidence from C¸atalho¨yu¨k
Archaeological evidence from the site of C¸atalho¨yu¨k is particularly intriguing
from the conceptual point of view. Of the activities the occupants of the site
engaged in, much is known. How these activities were conceptualized is far
less clear. There is considerable scope for framing hypotheses of a meronomic
nature. The aim here will be to look for evidence of creativity in ordinary
day-to-day activities, building in particular. This is not to deny there is consid-
erable evidence of seemingly artistic creative activities, such as wall painting,
figurine making, body adornment, bead making, and so on. It simply reflects
the degree to which the creative implications of those activities have been exam-
ined elsewhere [citation of relevant chapter(s)]. The review of the archaeological
evidence below draws primarily on Ian Hodder’s introductory presentation to
the ‘Consciousness and Creativity at the Dawn of Settled Life’ conference at
the McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, University of Cambridge,
July 27-July 30 2017; information is also taken from (Hodder, 2006a, 2006b,
2012), and from the C¸atalho¨yu¨k Research Project website. The assumed initial
endowment of concepts remains as above.
The starting point in the interpretation of neolithic C¸atalho¨yu¨k is generally
Mellaart’s (1967) conception of the site as a town. The site is known to consist of
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a large number of rectangular brick buildings, and these are generally interpreted
as the dwellings of a settlement, spread over multiple levels. It has emerged,
however, that the site lacks many of the features one would expect to find in
a settlement, and the extent to which houses were used as places of burial has
also become apparent. This raises a basic question of interpretation. Were the
buildings of C¸atalho¨yu¨k conceptualized as houses for the living, or houses for
the dead? In meronomic terms, the question is whether the conceptualization
of a building was more akin to a construct with DWELLING or TOMB as parent.
The two possibilities can be compared for the degree that they imply acts of
conceptual creativity. The buildings of C¸atalho¨yu¨k have ovens and hearths, and
show unequivocal evidence of cooking and food-consumption. On the basis that
cooking facilities play a vital part in any human dwelling, a conceptualization
based on DWELLING is surely not unrealistic. Meronomically, it would seem to
be towards the derivative end of the inventive/derivative dimension.
Not all the evidence points in this direction, however. Many facilities that
would seem to play an important role in a structure conceptualized as a dwelling
are found to be missing. It is now recognized that the buildings had no win-
dows, for example. Apparently, this does not reflect a lack of window-making
know-how, as lintels were used internally (for doors). Mellaart (1967) assumed
the buildings must have had windows, and took the step of visualizing them pic-
torially. But hard evidence of their existence has not been obtained. As well as
having no windows, the buildings lack external doors. In place of external doors,
they have roof hatches, allowing descent by ladder. Internal arrangements are
also seemingly at odds with the purpose of a dwelling. Where internal doors
exist, they may be too low to walk through, necessitating the use of crawling.
Most strikingly of all, buildings were used for burying the dead, with the siting
of graves within buildings being highly organized and systematic. The extent to
which this activity existed is also of note. Buildings have been found to contain
more than 60 graves.
Some of the infrastructural evidence also seems antithetical with the settle-
ment interpretation. The buildings are crammed together wall-to-wall, meaning
that moving from the bottom to the top of the settlement would have involved
clambering over a series of roofs, all at different elevations (Hodder, 2006b).
Transporting heavy objects or building materials from one location to another
would presumably have been nightmarishly difficult. There are no streets or
communal spaces, and scant evidence of neighbourhoods.7 At its peak, it is
thought the site would have involved the lives of as many as eight thousand
people. Yet evidence of the non-house-based industrial and commercial activ-
ities such a substantial population would imply is lacking. Signs of communal
gathering are detected, but only some way away from the site.
The archaeological data reveal that at some point in the life of a building,
it would be dismantled/demolished and possibly burned as well. It would then
be replaced with a construction immediately above, and essentially identical to
7At the consciousness and creativity conference, Colin Renfrew characterized his reaction
to this aspect of the evidence as ‘bemusement’.
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the one demolished. There are indications of this activity having a mortuary
purpose. The layout of graves (including what are described as ‘bone nests’) at
one level would be replicated in the building above, suggesting an attempt to
connect the dead together by physical alignment.
From the meronomic point of view, there are various ways to approach this
puzzling evidence. Conceptualization of the buildings as dwellings might rep-
resent a meronomic construction of extreme inventiveness; i.e., accommodation
within DWELLING of a combination of phenomena that would fail most tests
of dwelling-hood. On this view, the act can be seen as considerably creative,
at least in terms of extensional innovation. At the same time, it is difficult to
see how it could lead on to others, on which basis it would also appear to be
of low potency. The indications for conceptual creativity are contradictory in
this sense. Conceptualization of the buildings as dwellings suggests considerable
creativity on the inventive/derivative dimension, but less so on the potent/inert
dimension.
An alternative scheme is more along the lines of the IMPLANTATION inter-
pretation of Gebel’s heavy-tool example. The starting point, in this case, is
the assumption of the buildings being, not houses for the living, but houses for
the dead. The main construction is envisaged to have something like TOMB,
rather than DWELLING as its parent. Again, there are suggestions that any such
structure would be conceptually inventive. All the buildings at C¸atalho¨yu¨k in-
corporate ovens and cooking areas, and there is evidence of these being used for
normal daily consumption of food. To the extent that cooking and eating seem
not to be constitutive of tomb-hood, a conceptualization based on TOMB would
seem to be inventive necessarily.
On the other hand, even in the modern world, eating and burial-making
can be combined, as in a wake. So accommodation of these activities within
the concept of a tomb may not be entirely ruled out. Again, the concept of
IMPLANTATION could play a connective role. If placement of the dead into
carefully sculpted graves is assumed to be conceptualized as entombment, this
might imply a conceptual connection with the idea of implantation into a life
source (i.e., the ground). In light of the evidence of dwellings being system-
atically dismantled and burned, conceptualization of the buildings might then
deviate significantly from the modern idea of a tomb. It might refer to an ‘elab-
orate mortuary ceremonialism’ more generally (Pauketat, 2013, p. 47), in which
demolition and burning of a tomb is used to finally convey the dead back into
what is conceptualized as the source of life.
This scheme assumes several interlocking constructions, some of which might
be inventive. Conceptualization of a brick construction as a vehicle would cer-
tainly count as such if it were made in the face of extensional meanings with no
intersection. Similarly, with the combination of burial-making and feast-making
conceptualized as an implantation. Given the range of possible accommodations
of IMPLANTATION, this particular construction would seem especially inventive.
Also of interest is the conceptualization of physical alignment as a means of
securing a physical connection. This also suggests inventive processes of con-
ceptualization.
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There are, in addition, indications of constructive potency, however. If we
assume the dismantling and burning of buildings was conceptualized as a way
of consolidating the transmission of dead occupants into the ground, this might
imply conceptual connections with other cases of deliberate breakage. Gebel
records the finding of an intentionally broken ‘flint dagger found in a collective
burial’ (Gebel, 2013, p. 200). If deliberate breakage of a weapon can be related
to deliberate destruction of buildings at C¸atalho¨yu¨k, this might imply the exis-
tence of a very potent originating conceptualization dealing with breakage and
its capacity to connect life and death. It is not impossible to see in this signs
of substantive conceptual creativity on the inert/potent dimension.
Generally, then, meronomic assessment of the evidence from C¸atalho¨yu¨k
can be developed in at least two ways. Which version is preferred depends on
whether the buildings are interpreted as houses for the living, or houses for the
dead. It depends, ultimately, on whether archaeologists come to interpret the
site as a settlement of dwellings distributed over multiple levels, or as one or
more mounds of composited tombs. In either case, it is possible to interpret the
behaviors that seem to be implied as showing evidence of conceptual creativity
on the inventive/derivative dimension. But the interpretation of the site in terms
of tomb-mounds seems to open the way for richer interpretations of creativity
on the inert/potent dimension.
The final conclusion of the present approach, then, has to be that the build-
ing activities evidenced at C¸atalho¨yu¨k can certainly be interpreted as expressing
conceptual creativity. But it seems such interpretations are developed more eas-
ily, and to a greater extent if the site is viewed as a compositing of tombs,
than as a settlement. To the extent that cognitive change can be modeled as
conceptual creativity, the case for detecting manifestations of cognitive change
at the site is not lacking in foundation. Analysis to see if this result can be
taken forward and made precise might pay dividends. The fabulously rich data
emerging from the excavation of C¸atalho¨yu¨k is surely a treasure trove for cogni-
tive science, no less than for archaeology. It is hoped that future applications of
meronomic analysis will be able to contribute to understanding what the people
of this time and place really had in mind.
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